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COPYRIGHT OF TEXTILE DESIGNS - CLARITY AND 
CONFUSION IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
Thomas Ehrlich* 
FOR decades textile designers have sought without success to check the piracy of their patterns.1 Numerous bills aimed at 
protecting designers have failed in Congress.2 Until recently, the 
few federal courts which had considered the question had held 
that neither the Copyright Act nor the common law afforded pro-
tection.3 After the Supreme Court's decision in Mazer v. Stein,4 
however, it seemed that relief might at last be available. In that 
case the Court held that the utilitarian purpose of an object did 
not exclude it from copyright protection. The Copyright Office 
revised its regulations to include textile designs within the scope of 
the act;5 yet the regulations left unanswered a number of difficult 
problems in the practical realization of this protection. 
Judge Learned Hand, in Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., felt 
compelled to write that while relief had to be denied, "it would 
seem as though the plaintiff had suffered a grievance for which 
there should be a remedy .... "6 It was therefore entirely appro-
priate that it was also Judge Hand who ·wrote the first appellate 
opinion sustaining the copyright on a textile design, Peter Pan 
Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp.7 The opinion has been sub-
ject to some misinterpretation,8 and it seems well to review exactly 
• Member of the Wisconsin Bar.-Ed. I spent the past year as Law Clerk to Judge 
Hand, and happily acknowledge that my views on the subject of this article were tempered 
by his.-T.E. 
1 See generally Young, Freebooters in Fashions: The Need for a Copyright in Textile 
and Garment Designs, in ASCAP, COPYRIGHT LAw SYMPOSIUM, NUMBER NINE 76 (1958); 
GoTSHAL &: LIEF, THE PIRATES WILL GET You (1945); Weikart, Design Piracy, 19 IND. L.J. 
235 (1944). 
2 E.g., H.R. 8873, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); H.R. 2860, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). 
3E.g., Verney Corp. v. Rose Fabric Converters Corp., 87 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) 
(copyright); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929) (L. Hand, J.) 
(unfair competition). 
4 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
5 Sec 37 C.F.R. § 202.10 (b) (1960). It might be argued that designs were implicitly 
included in the former regulations. 
6 35 F.2d 279, 281 (2d Cir. 1929). 
7 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960). Just fifty years ago, Judge Hand held that lack of 
artistic merit was irrelevant to the validity of a musical composition, and that although 
the work had only financial value, a court must protect that value. Hein v. Harris, 175 
Fed. 875 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 183 Fed. 107 (2d Cir. 1910). "Certainly the qualifications of 
judges would have to be very different from what they are if they were to be constituted 
censors of the arts." 175 Fed. at 877. In that Mazer v. Stein reflects a disinclination to weigh 
artistic against pecuniary value, it was foreshadowed by the Hein opinion. 
s See 73 HARV. L. REv. 1613 (1960). This Recent Case discussion fails to examine 
Judge Hand's reasoning or the limitation he imposed on the holding in the case. 
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what was decided. This article will discuss the opinion, one which 
followed close on its heels,9 and several of the problems raised. 
The factual situation in Peter Pan may be briefly stated. The 
plaintiff, a converter of gray goods, owned a registered copyright 
on an original design. He sold bolts of printed cloth to dress 
manufacturers; notices of copyright were printed on the selvage 
next to each copy of the design. In the making of dresses, the 
manufacturers either cut off the notices or sewed them within 
seams. The plaintiff sought to enjoin an alleged infringement by 
the defendant, a competing converter. The defendant denied 
infringement and claimed that the plaintiff's copyright had been 
forfeited under section IO because the notices were hidden or re-
moved by the dressmakers.10 The court denied both contentions 
and affirmed a preliminary injunction. Judge Friendly dissented 
on the ground that the copyright had been forfeited. 
In a number of cases involving literary property, Judge Hand 
has emphasized the difficulties in determining what are "ideas," 
and what "expressions."11 But while he is "as aware as any one 
that the line, wherever it is drawn, will seem arbitrary, that is no 
excuse for not drawing it .... "12 He reiterated these problems in 
Peter Pan, adding that "in the case of designs, which are addressed 
to the aesthetic sensibilities of an observer, the test is, if possible, 
even more intangible.''18 Yet some focus is necessary, and Judge 
Hand found it in "the uses for which the design is intended, espe• 
cially the scrutiny that observers will give to it as used."14 In 
viewing a design, one must "try to estimate how far its overall ap-
pearance will determine its aesthetic appeal when the cloth is made 
into a garment." Upon examination he found that while the two 
patterns "are not identical ... the ordinary observer, unless he set 
out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, 
and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same. That is enough; 
and indeed it is all that can be said, unless protection against in-
9 H. M. Kolbe Co. v. Armgus Te.xtile Co., Zl9 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1960). 
10 This section provides that copyright protection is available only if a Notice of 
Copyright is "affixed to each copy • • . published or offered for sale • • • by authority of 
the proprietor." 17 U.S.C. §IO (1958). 
llE.g., Fitch v. Young, 230 Fed. 743 (S.D.N.Y. 19Il). Of course, only "expressions" 
are copyrightable. 
12 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F .2d Il9, 122 (2d Cir. 1930). While still a 
district judge he wrote that "it has never been very satisfactorily established, and prob-
ably never can be, at what point a plagiarism ceases to copy the e.xpression of an 
author's ideas and steals only the ideas themselves." Fitch v. Young, supra note II, at 
745-46. 
13 Z74 F.2d at 489. 
14Ibid. 
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fringement is to be denied because of variants irrelevant to the 
purpose for which the design is intended."15 Judge Hand cer-
tainly did not mean that if the "aesthetic appeal" of two designs 
is the same, physical distinctions should be ignored. Rather he 
held that if two patterns are identical except for minor variances, 
these variances should not be considered a new "expression." 
It has been contended that this test is not sufficiently strict in 
light of the peculiar nature of the fashion industry. It is true that 
certain "themes" may predominate during a particular season, 
and a number of designs may be independently developed from 
the same "idea.''16 But it would be absurd to say that minor 
alterations of a complex pattern, the originality of which is not in 
question,17 should exonerate.18 The fabrics are intended for 
public use; their success will depend upon their distinctive appeal 
to the public. Should not, therefore, the test be whether those 
who will wear garments made from the materials, unless they "set 
out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, 
and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same"?19 No one, least of 
all Judge Hand, would declare this to be a magic formula. Yet it 
does set the perspective within which alleged infringements are to 
be examined; more cannot be done. 
It must be admitted that the fifty-six year copyright protection 
is hardly ideally suited to the spasmodic shifts of the design world, 
and it is therefore protection that should not be too freely granted, 
lest competition be smothered. But competition in the industry 
can best be promoted not by a strict view of the standards of in-
fringement but rather by particular care in declaring a pattern to 
be "original."20 In the Peter Pan case the question was not raised, 
and indeed the pattern was one of rather striking originality. But 
in future cases it is to be hoped that new "expressions" of "ideas" 
will not be too easily found. 
Judge Hand's reasons for denying the defendant's claim of 
forfeiture are somewhat more difficult to follow, and it may 
simplify this discussion to begin with the position of Judge Friend-
115Ibid. 
16 See 73 HARv. L. REv. 1613 (1960). 
17 Millworth Converting Corp. v. Slifka, 276 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1960) makes it clear 
that only the original elements of a design are copyrightable. 
18 See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), in which, 
regarding literary property, Judge Hand wrote that "the right cannot be limited literally 
to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations." 
19 274 F.2d at 489. 
20 It must be admitted that this approach is a deviation from some recent cases. See, 
e.g., Alfred Bell &: Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951). 
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ly in his dissent. It is a requisite for copyright protection that a 
notice of copyright be "affixed to each copy . . . published or 
offered for sale ... by authority of the ... proprietor .... "21 A 
statutory exception is specifically granted only for "omission by 
accident or mistake of the prescribed notice from a particular copy 
or copies .... "22 Sales by dress manufacturers who had purchased 
bolts of plaintiff's cloth were certainly, wrote Judge Friendly, "by 
authority of" the plaintiff. It followed that, since notice did not 
appear on every copy of the design "offered for sale," the copy-
right was forfeited. 
Judge Hand, apparently assuming that, on the basis of Mazer 
v. Stein and the present copyright regulations, textile designs may 
be "theoretically" copyrighted, admitted that "if we construe the 
words of section 10 with relentless literalism, dresses made out of 
the 'converted' cloth may be said to be 'offered for sale' without any 
effective notice."23 Judge Hand seems to have based his analysis 
on the thesis that it could not have been the intent of Congress to 
permit a commercial design to be copyrighted but yet require the 
immediate forfeiture of the copyright when the article is put to 
the very use for which copyright was sought. While it may well 
be argued whether Congress did intend copyright to extend to 
textile designs, if this is assumed, the remainder of Judge Hand's 
argument has a compelling force.24 Based on this thesis, Judge 
Hand held that an owner of a design copyright must do the best 
he can, consistent with commercial requirements, to see to it that 
notices remain on the copies after they leave his hands. As forfei-
ture is a defense to be proved when infringement has been estab-
lished, the burden is on the defendant "to show that 'notice' could 
have been embodied in the design without impairing its market 
value."211 The defendant must therefore show that a notice worked 
into each repetition of a design would not alter the public's desire 
to purchase a garment on which the design was printed. Of course, 
the public's reaction to embodying notices might vary according 
to the garment on which the design is printed, and presumably a 
court must consider the likelihood that a design will be displayed 
on, for example, underwear rather than dresses. If the defendant 
2117 u.s.c. § 10 (1958). 
22 17 u.s.c. § 21 (1958). 
2a 274 F.2d at 489. 
24 Mazer v. Stein can, however, be interpreted to mean simply that the purpose of a 
work is irrelevant to its copyrightability-that commercial works should be viewed with 
neither special solicitude nor special disfavor. 
25 274 F.2d at 490. 
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can successfully meet his burden, the copyright has been forfeited. 
But if it is feasible to place notices only on the selvage of a partic-
ular design, the copyright is maintained though many of the notices 
are cut off or hidden when they leave the hands of the dressmakers. 
It may be assumed that if the defendant proves that it was feasible 
to embody a© with the originator's initials within the design, he 
must also show that it was practicable to imprint the originator's 
full name on the back or some other "accessible portion" of the 
fabric.26 
On two other points some confusion may be caused by Judge 
Hand's opinion. First, he indicates that there is some question 
whether a "notice" would be "affixed" to a design, within the 
meaning of section I 0, when it is incorporated into the design 
rather than added to it-in other words, whether "affix" neces-
sarily implies adding the notice to a copy after its creation and 
registration. But it seems hardly possible that such a semantic ob-
jection could be in any way determinative. Second, and more 
significant, there is some intimation in the opinion that the sales 
of dresses were not "by authority of" the plaintiff within the mean-
ing of section 10. Thus Judge Friendly wrote, "I am not alto-
gether clear whether my brothers say that the sale of the dresses 
was not an offer for sale with the authority of the copyright pro-
prietor or that it was such an offer but that notice need not be 
affixed if this was not feasible." However, Judge Hand's holding 
that the defendant must prove that notice "could have been em-
bodied in the design without impairing its market value" makes 
it plain that he considered the sale an authorized one. Certainly 
his opinion does not suggest that a different rule should be applied 
to dress manufacturers who convert their o-wn fabric. 
It may be argued, however, that application of the phrase "by 
the authority of" should be confined to those cases in which the 
seller is acting as agent or licensee for the copyright proprietor.27 
In other words, the phrase implies continuing control, and even 
though a proprietor may know that dress manufacturers will sell 
copies of his design without notices, he cannot, once he has sold 
the bolts of converted cloth to them, restrain their use of the fabric. 
This analysis avoids many of the problems raised by the majority's 
opinion. At the same time, it leaves the door open to decide that 
20 17 U.S.C. § 19 (1958). It is doubtful whether the selvage of a fabric would qualify 
as an "accessible" portion. 
27 This was the situation in National Comic Pubs., Inc. v. Fawcett Pubs., Inc., 191 
F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951) (L. Hand, J.). 
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the statutory requirement is one of reasonable notice, and that 
notice on the selvage is insufficient because it is not likely to re-
main.28 This approach, however, assumes as a starting point com-
pleted sales by the proprietor; yet why should the proprietor not 
have to secure an agreement from manufacturer that notices 
printed on the selvage will be visible on finished garments? The 
only answer is that it is commercially infeasible to exact such agree-
ments-Judge Hand's rationale for relaxing the notice require-
ment. In this light, the preferable view is that adopted by both 
Judge Hand and Judge Friendly: "sale ... by authority" includes 
situations in which the proprietor has acquiesced by inaction in the 
removal of notices by one who has purchased from him. Other-
wise the notice provision could be too easily avoided by the use of 
an intermediary. 
It cannot be disputed that Judge Hand was deviating from 
those prior decisions which called for strict compliance with the 
statutory requirements of notice. He admitted that this was a 
situation in which "a literal interpretation of the words of a 
statute is not ... a safe guide to its meaning." Judge Friendly 
commented that "perhaps my brothers are right in thinking that 
Congress wished literal compliance with section IO to be excused 
under such circumstances as here; but the voice so audible to them 
is silent to me." He wrote that he "could reconcile the majority's 
result with the language of section IO if, but only if, ... there were 
clear evidence that the dominant intention of Congress was to 
afford the widest possible copyright protection whereas the notice 
requirement was deemed formal or at least secondary." However, 
he found "nothing to support such a stratified reading of section 
10." But, as noted, if it is assumed that Congress intended that the 
Copyright Act be available to commercial textile designs, it is 
difficult to deny protection whenever the designs are marketed, 
even though no more permanent notice is feasible. In other 
words, the application of Mazer v. Stein to textile designs requires 
a new interpretation of the notice requirements. 
In further support of Judge Hand's position, it may be noted 
that insofar as the notice provision was enacted for the purpose of 
ensuring that all potential copyists 1vill be aware of copyrights,29 
28 The standard adopted might be similar to that in the 1955 Universal Copyright 
Convention, § 9(c). 
29 Judge Hand has regarded this as the purpose of the notice provision. "[A]ny 
notice will serve which does in fact advise ..• that there is a 'proprietor' who does claim 
copyright, provided the notice does not affirmatively mislead." National Comics Pubs., 
Inc. v. Fawcett Pubs., Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 602-03 (2d Cir. 1951). For a brief analysis of the 
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enforcement of that provision need not be as strict in the case of 
textile designs as it is for literary works. It may be argued that al-
though one notice is necessary for each copy of a book, a similar 
rule need not be applied to textile designs because potential 
copyists will generally view a number of copies together, and if 
one notice appears, that is sufficient. And infringement by house-
wives who have purchased dresses made from Peter Pan's fabrics 
is hardly that company's chief concern; rather it is competing con-
verters who are likely to copy. These converters know that if a 
notice of copyright appears at all on a dress, it will appear within a 
sewn seam. It is not too great a burden to require them to examine 
carefully the garments whose designs they wish to copy. Similarly, 
it seems justifiable to require converters to see to it that each dress 
made from their fabrics has at least one notice.30 
Such an approach requires, however, a rejection of Louis 
Dejonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co.,31 in which Mr. Justice 
Holmes held for the Court that one notice for every twelve repro-
ductions of a design on Christmas ·wrapping paper was insufficient. 
Mr. Justice Holmes justified this narrow interpretation on the 
ground that "the appellant is claiming the same rights as if this 
work were one of the masterpieces of the world, and he must take 
them with the same limitations that would apply to a portrait, a 
holy family, or a scene of war." 
One panel of the Second Circuit had no sooner charted the 
outlines of an emerging copyright law when another panel, in 
H. M. Kolbe Co. v. Armgus Textile Co.,32 shattered these outlines 
and left the law in complete confusion. A group of eight identical 
roses on a piece of fabric had been submitted for registration. 
Each was a reproduction of the same portion of the same "work of 
art,"33 and registration had been sought and obtained under sec-
tion 5 (h): "Reproductions of a work of art." One notice appeared 
for every eight reproductions. The defendant claimed that it was 
commercially feasible to embody notice in the design. District 
Judge Murphy rejected an offer of proof, holding as a matter of 
various proposals which have been made concerning revision of the notice requirement, 
see Notice of Copyright, STIJDY No. 6, GENERAL REvlsION OF THE COPYRIGHT LAw (U.S. 
Copyright Office 1958) 41--55. 
30 It may also be contended, however, that a dress made from a number of copyrighted 
reproductions of a design is analogous to a volume which binds a number of copyrighted 
newspapers, and that since Congress specifically permitted in § 20 just "one notice of 
copyright in each volume ••. of a newspaper," the court was legislating when it created a 
similar exception for designs. 
31235 U.S. 33, 37 (1914). 
32 279 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1960). 
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law that, under Peter Pan, notice on the selvage was sufficient.34 
In a per curiam decision, Judges Clark and Moore affirmed. 
Judge Friendly dissented. The full majority opinion is as follows: 
PER CURIAM 
For the reasons stated by Judge Murphy in his opinion be-
low, D.C.S.D.N.Y., April 28, 1960, 184 F. Supp. 423 we con-
clude that plaintiff has made a prima fade showing both of the 
validity of its copyright and of infringement by the defend-
ants, and hence is entitled to the injunction pending suit 
granted below. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner 
Corp., 2 Cir., 274 F. 2d 487. 
Affirmed 
This opinion shows little else than that the Supreme Court is 
not alone in its malpractice of per curiam mystiques.35 
Only three "explanations" seem possible; none is rational. 
The first is that on its face the claim that notice "could have been 
embodied in the design without impairing its market value"36 was 
frivolous. Yet from Judge Friendly's dissent, such an interpreta-
tion is most unlikely, and certainly if this is what the court meant 
it would not have affirmed "for the reasons stated by Judge 
Murphy." Second, it may be that the court intended to overrule, 
sub silentio, the exception that Judge Hand interposed to his 
primary rule that notice on the selvage is sufficient. It is incredible 
that, without explanation, such a procedure would be followed. 
Finally, and most probably, the court may have interpreted Judge 
Hand's opinion as permitting evidence concerning the feasibility 
of embodying notice in the design only in a suit for a permanent 
injunction, not in a proceeding for interlocutory relief. This in-
terpretation seems likely from the court's use of the phrase "a 
prima fade showing." Yet the Peter Pan case involved a prelimi-
nary injunction, and there is no indication in Judge Hand's 
decision that notice on the selvage was, as a matter of law, sufficient 
for a preliminary injunction. As Judge Friendly wrote in his 
dissent, it is "important that the Court make its position clear and 
not content itself with saying that plaintiff has made a sufficient 
showing of validity to warrant interlocutory relief. If a temporary 
injunction is granted in a case like this, the plaintiff has obtained 
33 Alternate roses were inverted. 
34184 F. Supp. 423 (D.C.N.Y. 1960). 
35 See Brown, Foreword: Process of Law, 72 HARV. L. REv. 77 (1958). 
36 279 F.2d at 555. 
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all he wants and the action will usually go no further."37 What-
ever its basis, the decision has left the state of the design copyright 
law even less certain than it was before the Peter Pan case. 
Judge Friendly, in his dissent, rejected the lower court's inter-
pretation of Peter Pan.38 "If the case presented no other issues," 
he would have remanded for findings whether the defendant 
carried the burden of proving that " 'notice' could have been em-
bodied in the design." In his view, however, the complaint should 
have been dismissed on its face. He wrote that "the 'reproduction' 
was each square, not eight," interpreting section 5 (h) as limiting 
copyright to a single reproduction, though the subsection itself 
refers to "reproductions" just as all the other subsections are 
·written in plural terms. It is difficult to believe that Judge 
Friendly relied on his view of section 5, however, for the problem, 
I think at most a semantic one, of copyrighting a number of re-
productions of a work of art, may be avoided by registration under 
section 5 (k): "Prints and pictorial illustrations including prints 
on labels used for articles of merchandize." There appears no 
reason why, consistent with the De] onge case, a number of 
identical figures cannot be copyrighted as a single "print."39 And 
section 5 specifically provides that "any error in classification [ shall 
not] invalidate or impair the copyright protection secured under 
this title." The point was not raised, however, in Judge Friendly's 
dissent. 
Judge Friendly's main theme appears to be that under the 
De] onge case, section IO requires a notice on each copy of an 
artistic unit, and it is for the the court to decide what is the proper 
unit. Interpreting section 5 in a manner complementary to this 
view of section IO, he said that only one of the identical designs 
was copyrightable, not the whole group of eight. By this view, it 
is irrelevant whether copyright is sought under section 5 (h) or 
section 5 (k). 
It seems preferable, however, first to determine what is copy-
rightable, and then to examine the sufficiency of notice. Neither 
the language of the statute nor the intent of Congress seem to 
forbid registration of several reproductions as a single unit. Un-
like the Kolbe case, in Dejonge a reproduction of only a single 
figure was submitted to the Copyright Office, and the case may be 
read as simply requiring that there be one notice per copyrighted 
37 ld. at 557. 
88 Id. at 555-57. 
so See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Brenda Fabrics, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
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unit, not as limiting the character of such units. The mechanics 
of registration look toward this approach. The "work of art" 
which is reproduced need not be sent, and therefore those in the 
Copyright Office cannot know whether they have received a "re-
production." Should not whatever design or group of designs is 
submitted for registration be deemed copyrightable provided it 
meets the standards of originality? If a designer copies a "work 
of art" consisting of eight identical patterns, the model for each 
being the same still life, presumably copyright would be permitted, 
and only one notice required. Why should the rule be different 
if only one of the patterns is submitted to the Copyright Office, 
but it is repeated eight times? And if a number of reproductions 
may be considered a single unit under section 5 (h), why should 
not the same be true under section 1 0? There appears no reason 
why a court rather than the proprietor should determine what is 
the proper artistic unit. Difficult questions would inevitably arise 
under Judge Friendly's approach. His view would be hard to 
apply if a series of identical designs were grouped together, in a 
novel way, into a single unit. In fact, in the Kolbe case, alternate 
roses were inverted, and it may be argued that their relationship to 
each other was significant apart from their individual design. Such 
questions would be avoided by the position taken above. This 
position would not, however, lead to the reductio ad absurdum 
suggested by Judge Friendly in his dissent-that a whole bolt of 
cloth might be submitted to the Copyright Office and thereafter 
be protected by a single notice. It should be clear that such notice 
would be inadequate by analogy to cases which have held that an 
indistinct notice was insufficient.40 
Judge Friendly concluded his opinion by writing: "With the 
natural concentration of this type of litigation in the Second Cir-
cuit, a concentration not likely to be diminished by our rulings in 
Peter Pan and here, this Court's decisions make law for the textile 
industry in an unusual degree."41 But by its decision in Kolbe, 
the court made not law but confusion. One can only hope that 
the circuit will soon bring some order to its chaos. 
40 E.g., Smith v. Bartlett, 18 F. Supp. 35 (D.C. Me. 1937). 
41279 F.2d at 557. 
